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and man acts within the realm of possibiliti~s t~e .pro~uctive
system provides. In primitive society man apphed dlst~c~l?ns ~e
. d· nature to himself as a means to create artificial dis-perceIve In . 031 o·
tinctions between men and provide a basis of SOCI organIzatIon.
In modern societies the mode of production and the ~y~te~ of
exchange creates economic inequalities that creat: real dlS.tmctlO~s
between men. These distinctions are used as a basts to ~e~u:e social
relations and the structure of society. Whereas pnrmnve man
determined the superstructure, and exchange provided a. sy.ste~
1· k men together the superstructure in modern socteties ISto , 0 0 ali 0
determined by the mode of production. Economic mequ ities
created by the system of exchange are used to differentiate among
men. b f ialDifferentiation and exchange serve as the ases 0 SOCI
hesi . b th types of society, but obey entirely different
co esion ill 0 db ifi ial
"historical logics." The totemic society is stablize ~ an arti lCl
homology with nature, whereby man becomes ~ubJect thro~gh
the application of natural objectivity. In caste society production
for exchange becomes the center of the syste~, ~ut only at the
expense of displacing men from their dererminanve role as the
subject of history.
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NOTES AND COMMENTS
"WHY DOESN'T HE MENTION SO-AND-SO?"
Martin E. Spencer
State University College ofNew York at Oneonta
It is especially telling, I think, that a chapter entitled 'Responses
to Death and Stages of Grieving' could be written without refer-
ence to either Freud or Erich Lindemann. Or, as another exam-
ple, chapter 4 (a rather peculiar section, reviewing some of the
various 'contexts' in which death occurs, i.e., homicide, disease,
accident, etc.) manages to discuss situations of mass death in war
and natural disaster without so much as a nod in the direction of
Robert Lifton (Lofland, 1979).
The above is a typical specimen of the genre of academic
comment that I shall refer to here as "why doesn't he mention
so-and-so?" Taken at face value, the purpose of such remarks is
to set straight a piece of unsound academic business. But, I shall
argue, the tone .0£ righteous intellectual indignation that appears
in comments of this order is misplaced, because what they really
signify is a profound "epistemological pathology" of the social
sciences. On the deepest level of its consequences, this pathology
condemns the social sciences to a collective existence charac-
terized by the profitless rise and fall of "mutually hostile and ex-
clusive schools of thought .
As an index of this pathology, I shall focus on the use of
citations in social science, a use that is generally, as concerns its
rationale, "taken-for-granted." For our purposes, let us initially
consider citations in the broad category of "primary" and "secon-
dary" citations. The first concerns the use of "data" or "evidence,"
and their purpose appears to be the documentation of such·
"evidence," i.e., the rooting of the arguments in the "facts" of
social reality. I shall consider citations of this order in due course,
but, for the moment, let us focus on the "secondary citations."
These are citations that refer, not to the "data," "evidence," or
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"facts" of the "real world," but to other writings in social science.
I ask then: What is the purpose of such "secondary" citations?
An immediate, and obvious answer that comes to mind is
that such secondary citations serve to integrate the work at hand
into the context of related ideas in the social sciences. According
to this view the secondary citation is the essential link between
on-going wo~k and the "edifice of thought" that is constituted.by
the cumulative endeavors of social science. Without such a hnk
there could be no continuity, no development, no progress in the
social sciences. Let us then subject this elegant, and as it turns
out, entirely specious rationale, to closer scrutiny · .,
We must first ask, if the purpose of such secondary citations
is that which is stated above, how is it that today we encounter
little or no reference to famous names in the earlier history of
the disciplines. For example, in sociology who today refers .to
Von Wiese, Vierkandt, Spann, Mosca, Spencer, Pareto, Sorokin,
Giddings, Hobhouse, Schmalenbach, Ross, Cooley, Th?m~s,
Sumner, Tarde, etc.? If secondary citations are used to maintain
the continuity of thought in the social sciences, why have these
names been substantially lost from view?
A related consideration is what appears to be the pattern
of an on-going temporal shift in the fashionability of citations.
Thus, some years ago the names of Parsons, Mills, Mannheim, and
Riesman were prominent in American sociology, and now seem
to have yielded to the newer lights of Gouldner, Goffman, ~lau,
and Berger. All of this is "impressionistic" to be sure, but it at .
least suggests that secondary citations are not linked.to a rrogres-
sive1y expanding "edifice of knowledge" in the social sciences.1 ..
There is also the problem of the parochialism of citations. In
a recent review, for example, it was noted that of 405 references
in a Russian book on "systems theory ," most of the citations were
to "Russian or East European writers" (Bredemier, 1979). One
can imagine the flurry of "why doesn't he mentions · · .? that will
greet this work from American, English, French an~ G~rma~
readers. And yet, as is well-known, such a pattern of citattons IS
by no means exceptional. American social scientists, poorly
schooled in foreign languages, rarely cite works in other lang-
uages (unless they are translated) and European writers, albeit
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to a considerably lesser degree, often return the compliment.
The extent to which the nationalist parochialism of citations can
be carried is illustrated by the fact that Durkheim and Weber,
living and writing at the same time, did not directly cite one
another in their works.f How then can we reconcile such a pat-
tern of cultural and nationalistic in-breeding of secondary cita-
tions with their supposedly universalistic function of building
and maintaing the progressive "edifice of knowledge" of the
social sciences?
Let us try still another approach to this problem of the
"manifest" theory of the use of secondary citations. Now imagine
that we are interested in placing the term "ideology" in its proper
context in the social sciences, and we are determined to use
secondary citations for this purpose. Who then shall we cite:
Mannheim, Marx, Hegel, Helvetius, Bacon, or Destutt de Tracy
(who originated the term in Elements d'Ideology)? And will any
or all of these citations accomplish the purpose of integrating the
concept of "ideology" into the history of the social sciences? If
we are honest about the matter we shall have to concede that
such an integration can only be effected by way of a study of
the history of the idea of "ideology" (e.g., Lichtheim, 1967)
and, in general, the satisfactory location of any idea in the context
of earlier work would require a similar undertaking, e.g., Talmon
(1970), Collingwood (1946), Cassirer (1971), Meinecke (1965),
Lovejoy (1936). From this point of view, then, the naive ex-
planation of the purpose of secondary citations must again be
rejected.
THE "LATENT FUNCTION" OF CITATIONS
For reasons that shall become clear in the following dis-
cussion, I shall not suppose that I have here persuaded the reader
that the idea of the "manifest functions" of secondary citations
as relating to the "progress" of the social sciences is untenable.
I hope, however, to effect this persuasion by outlining a theory
of the "latent functions" of citations that will better account
for the actual practices in use. My theory concerns ideas of the
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"conceptual spheres" of the social sciences, and the process of
scholarly communication in the social sciences.
The "conceptual sphere" denotes the complex of ideas
held in common by academic disciplines, by sub-disciplinary
areas of specialization, and by "schools of thought" in the dis-
ciplines. Thus, within the discipline of sociology these commonly-
held ideas are demarcated by the names of Weber, Durkheim,
Mead, Simmel, Mannheim, Freud, Marx, Tonnies, Parsons, Merton,
and Goffman, among others, All sociologists, whatever their
particular dispositions to focus on one or another of these writers,
are familiar with their ideas as constituting the "common heritage"
of the discipline. In addition, there are sub disciplinary specializa-
tions, e.g., political sociology, stratification, deviance, formal
organizations, marriage and the family, the sociologies of know-
ledge, religion, art, medicine, etc., which are each demarcated by
other names, whose ideas constitute the core of the "conceptual
spheres" of these areas. There are also the "schools of thought:"
Marxist sociology, Weberian sociology, phenomenological soci-
ology, ethnomethodology, structural-functionalism, structuralism,
etc. For each of these as well, a core set of names and ideas could
be provided. The "conceptual sphere" thus approximates what
is elsewhere described as the "collective consciousness," the
"stock 0 f knowledge, " "basic paradigms," or "ideology," al-
though I emphasize that it is not exactly equivalent to any of
these. I shall allow the exact meaning of this term to "unfold"
in the following discussion.
My argument is that the process of scholarly communica-
tion is oriented towards these conceptual' 'spheres. To put it-
more strongly, it is rooted in them, and dominated by them.
This process of communication hinges around three implicit
questions that are posed by the scholar as he confronts a book,
monograph, or article. These questions are: 1) why should I
read this? 2) what does this mean? and 3) why should I believe
what is stated here? Each of these questions is implicitly posed
in relation to the conceptual sphere.
Now, as vee shall see, the author implicitly addresses him-
self to these questions, but before we consider how this actually
proceeds we must examine the types of arguments that are made
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in the social sciences, because these determine exactly how the
questions of "relevance," "assimilation," and "credibility" are
answered. These arguments can be classified as: scholarly argu-
ments, applications, synthetic arguments, and new arguments.
Scholarly arguments are those that move entirely within the
realm of the conceptual sphere, and are thus of the familiar
species of exegeses that comment upon the ideas of authors whose
work constitutes the material of that sphere, e.g., Aron's German
Sociology (1964), and Parsons' Structure ofSocial Action (1968).
Applications are arguments that make empirical applications
of theory, e.g., Smelser's Social Change in the Industrial Revolu-
tion (1959) is aptly subtitled "An Application of (Parsonian)
Theory to the Industrial Revolution." Bellah's Tokugawa Religion
(1957) is an application of Weberian and Parsonian ideas to
Japanese society, and Parsons applies his own ideas to the "empir-
ical case" of the modernization of the world in The System of
Modern Societies (1971).
Synthetic Arguments are those that extend and develop the
ideas of the conceptual sphere, e.g., Berger and Luckmann's
development of the Schutzian paradigm (1967), Erikson's develop-
ment of Freudian theory into an ego psychology (1950), Parsons'
and Smelser's extension of Parsonian ideas (1956) and, of course,
the numberless extensions of Marxist theory (for an overview
see, e.g., Anderson, 1976 and Lichtheim, 1970). These arguments
may be said to exploit the "logic of possibilities" of the concep-
tual sphere as it stands. '.
.Neui Arguments are those that transcend existing conceptual
spheres.. Thus, the work of Marx, Freud, Mead,' Schutz, and
Parsons, when it first appeared, was of this genre, and more
recently, the work of Foucault (1970, 1976) must strike Anglo-
Saxon sociologists, in particular, as coming from somewhere in
outer space.
Let us now consider how the "three questions" implicitly
posed by the reader are implicitly answered by the writer who
wishes to communicate a message to the community of social
science.
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THE PROBLEM OF RELEVANCE3
The problem of relevance is posed by the questions, "why
should I read this?", and is answered by reference to the con-
ceptual spheres that establish the ground rules of relevance. For
an argument to be "relevant" to social scientists it must be rooted
in the conceptual spheres that they intellectually inhabit. An
argument that is outside of this conceptual sphere will be dis-
missed as "irrelevant." Thus, a sociologist who peruses journals
of history, psychology, economics, or political science (consider-
ing that he is so eccentric as to do this in the first place) will find
nothing "of interest" there unless it can be related to the concep-
tual spheres of sociology. The conceptual sphere, therefore,
defines what can be safely ignored.
Now the problem of relevance is automatically solved for
scholarly arguments, because these dwell entirely in established
conceptual spheres and their very titles declare their relevance
to those who inhabit these spheres, and their irrelevance to those
who do not. Thus, an article titled: "Weber and Freud: On the
Nature and Sources of Authority" (McIntosh, 1970) immediately
announces its relevance or irrelevance to the sociological reader
on the basis of the reader's conceptual sphere. The same is more-
or-less true of applications and synthetic arguments that brandish
conceptual spheres in their titles, for example: "Foundations of
Parental Influence on Adolescents: An Application of Social
Power Theory" (Smith, 1970); "Societal Reaction as an Expla- ,
nation of Mental Illness: An Evaluation" (Gove, 1970).
'-We can see now how the use of secondary citations is as-
sociated with the writer's response to the problem of relevance.
Specifically, what may be called "documentary citations" are
here employed to point to the conceptual sphere. Thus, in the
opening passages the writer cites the names associated with the
conceptual sphere by way of rooting the argument in it, for
example:
Regarding primary and secondary deviance, Lemert (1967:17)
says..." (Gove, 1970).
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Social power theorists of the past decade (Bannester, 1969;
Emerson, 1962; French and Raven, 1959; Harsanyi, 1962; Nagel,
1968; Raven, 1965; Secord and Backman, 1964:273-293; Tan-
nenbaum, 1962; Thibaut and Kelley, 1959:100-125; Wrong,
1968) have disagreed about various aspects of the conceptual-
ization of power (Smith, 1970).
By this device the writer "displays" the conceptual sphere,
saying in effect, "this is why you should be interested in what I
have to say." It should be obvious that "new arguments" face
special problems in, this regard, which I shall refer to later.
Another aspect of this "problem of relevance" is that empir-
ical problems a~e not "interesting" in themselves, but only become
so when they are related to the conceptual sphere, thus making
the argument a "synthetic empirical argument." The writer then
begins the presentation by "displaying" (documenting) the con-
ceptual sphere in relation to the empirical subject, for example:
The recurrently higher official arrest rate of negroes over whites
poses a persistent issue in the study of deviance relative to ethni-
city.. '. the extent to which the differential accounts for the
racial variance in crime rates remains problemical (Sellin ;1928:
64). One point of view holds out the prospect that under com-
parable circumstances the white and negro crime rates would
not differ substantially (Wolfgang; 1964:61) ... a less sanguine
view holds that the circumstances of whites and negroes are not
fully comparable, that the experience of the negro in America
differs not only in degree but in kind from that of lower class'
white ethnic minorities (Johnson 1941:94; Moses, 1947:420)
(quoted from Green, 1970:476-477).
The corollary to this is that, should an empirical subject be
presented without such reference to the conceptual sphere, it
would be rejected as: 1) "not interesting," and 2) not "social
science." The reader who doubts this is invited to search the
journalistic literature to find an empirical presentation that does
not make reference to the conceptualsphsre.s
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THE PROBLEM OF ASSIMILATION
The problem of assimilation is posed by the question: "What
does this mean?" and, once again, is answered with reference to
the conceptual spheres, because only in this way can it be made
intelligible. This translation is necessary, because social scientists
think in the language of their conceptual spheres.
In this connection the use of so-called "jargon" in the social
sciences can be correctly understood. The complaint of the
"layman" is that social scientists use a specialized language to
obfuscate the obvious. But this is not at all the case. The jargon
is in fact the language of the conceptual sphere, and it is used
because social scientists think in this language. Therefore, if one
wishes to be understood one must use the language of the
audience that is being addressed. The complexity, and perhaps
cumbersomeness of this specialized language, is intrinsic to the
cognitive structure of the conceptual sphere, and is no more a
device of deliberate mystification than is the use of any lang-
uage that is opaque to those who do not speak it.
Another device for solving the problem of assimilation is
the use of "translating citations." These, as the designation sug-
gests, translate the arguments into the language of the concept-
ual sphere by referring to the familiar ideas of writers whose
work constitutes the corpus of the sphere. Here are some examples
from Berger and Luckmann (1967) who, writing within the con-
ceptual sphere of Schutzian "phenomenological sociology,"
deploy .such translating citations in order to assimilate their
argument into other conceptual spheres in sociology :
54. Weber repeatedly refers to various collectivites as "carriers"
(Trager) of what we have called here sub-universes of meaning,
especially in his comparative sociology of religion. The analysis
of this phenomenon is, or course, related to Marx's unterbau/
ueberbau scheme.
57. This is the phonomenon commonly called "cultural lag" in
American sociology since Ogburn. We have avoided this term
because of its evolutionistic and implicitly evaluative connotation.
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60. Compare here Sartre's concept of the "practico-inert," in
Critique de la raison dialectique.
68. Both Marx and Pareto were aware of the possible autonomy
of what we have called legitimations ("ideology" in Marx,
"derivations" in Pareto) (Berger and Luckmann, 1967:200-201).
What is particularly interesting and revealing about these
"translating citations," as concerns the dynamics of the con-
ceptual sphere is that they are entirely superfluous. They add
nothing to the argument, which stands quite nicely without them.
But these citations are essential for the resolution of the problem
of assimilation: were they not there the reader would be inclined
to say: "This is not social science (as I know it)."
It follows from what has already been said about the types of
arguments in social science that the resolution of the problem of
assimilation poses different problems for each of them. Scholarly
arguments of course face no problem in this regard, since they
move entirely in the precincts of the conceptual sphere, "Appli-
cations" must translate the empirical area to which the theory is
being applied into the theoretical language. Synthetic arguments
must translate what is, new into the language of established con-
ceptual spheres, as the above examples illustrate.
THE PROBLEM OF CREDIBILITY
The problem of credibility is raised by the 'question': "Why
should I believe this?" An important consideration in dealing
with this challenge is the "display of erudition." The writer must
demonstrate mastery of the conceptual sphere and, if possible,
much more. To this end, familiarity with the names associated
with the conceptual sphere must be demonstrated. An adequate
array of documentary and translating citations will establish con-
fidence in the writer as a person who is thoroughly grounded in
the subject matter. The failure to pass these essential tests, i.e.,
the omission of obvious citations will be greeted, implicitly or
explicitly, with the fatal riposte: "Why doesn't he mention so-
and-so?"
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But the author can do more. He can overwhelm the reader
with learned citations that serve essentially to "display erudition,"
for example:
8. Schutz's "phenomenological" sociology is little more than
a development of Weber's methodological views and of the in-
dividualist idealism of the German Geisteswissenschaften tradi-
tion. Schutz's philosophical borrowings (from Husserl, Bergson,
and later from pragmatism) are different from those of Weber
(Heidelberg Neo-Kantianism), but they serve precisely the same
function. Schutz's work combines the irrationalism and personal-
ism of the German idealism with the conventionalist positivism
of speculative empiricists such as Duhem and Lazarsfeld. Weber,
of course, is the classic point of union of these two traditions"
(Hindess, 1977: 234n).
Impressive! And no doubt the reader will be mo~e read~y
inclined to accept the arguments of a writer who br~dI~h~swI~h
such apparent ease and self-confidence terms such as mdIvIduahst
idealism," "conventionalist positivism," "Geisteswissenchaften,"
and the like.
Canons of Evidence. But we seem here to have overlooked
the major consideration of the issue of credibility-t?e ':facts."
If we are speaking of "empirical" social science, that IS, VIrtually
all social science offering "non-scholarly" arguments, then surely
we must concede that the acceptanceor _rejection of an argument
ultimately depends on the "facts;' that .are cited in .suppor~, of ~t,
i.e., the "primary citations" rharpoint to the "eVIdence. ThIS,
I submit, is another specimen of naivete concerning the actual
workings of social science. My position is that the "facts" do not
"speak for themselves," but that the conventional canons of the
conceptual sphere determine what are "[acts." .. .
Consider, for example, that a perusal of certain major Amen-
can journals in sociology (e.g., The American Sociological Revie~,
The American Journal of Sociology) reveals a plethora of statts-
tical "data" in comparison to certain "theoretically" oriented
American and European journals (e.g., Theory and Society, The
British Journal ofSociology, The European Journal of Sociology).
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Does this mean that the latter dispense with "evidence" in com-
parison with the former?
A closer examination will indicate that this is not at all the
case. "Theoretical" sociology, insofar as it is not "scholarly" is
as "empirically" oriented as is so-called "empirical" sociology.
What is different is the nature of the "evidence" that it points to.
Thus, writings in ethnomethodology utilize what can be called
"observational" or "ethnographic" data. Historical sociology
relies on the "evidence" contained in historical writings (e.g.,
Moore, 1967; Wallerstein, 1974) although it may employ statis-
tical data as well (e.g., Paige, 1975). Phenomenological sociology
(Schutz, 1967) relies on "data" that may be called "experiental,"
in that it appeals to the reader's experience of the "taken-for-
granted" aspects of the social world. The difference, therefore,
is not in the presence or absence of an orientation to "social
reality," but in the conventional definitions of each conceptual
sphere as to what is "evidence" of "social reality."
These conventional canons of evidence will then be decisive
for the resolution of the problem of credibility. The social scien-
tist will implicitly or explicitly assess the credibility of a work in
terms of the conceptual sphere within which he thinks. Thus, the
experimental psychologist will rule out of court the non-quanti-
fiable, "anecdotal" data of clinical investigation (a factor that
delayed the acceptance of Piaget's work in the U.S.). The positi-
vistic, survey research oriented sociologist will summarily dismiss
the work of ethnomethodologists and phenornenologicalsociolo-
gists ("how do they know these things... ?"), and the latter will
return the compliment by' characterising positivistic data as'
"specious quantification.t'" The economic historian will have
nothing to do with the non-quantifiable works of political and
diplomatic "narrative" history, and the behavioral political scien-
tist will dispatch the writings of the political philosophers as
"impressionistic."
I have now argued above that the three "implicit questions"
posed by social scientists when reading a work in social science
are more-or-less implicitly answered by the author with reference
to the "conceptual sphere," and that the use of citations, both
"primary" and "secondary" can be explained in this connection.
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The question remains: in what sense is this "pathological' '? Let
us turn then to a consideration of how these practices constitute
an "epistemological pathology" of the social sciences.
THE "EPISTEMOLOGICAL PATHOLOGY" OF
THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
The key to an understanding of this phenomenon is pre-
sented in the justly celebrated work of Thomas Kuhn (1970),
who points out the consequences of the pathological development
of the conceptual sphere ("paradigms") in the natural sciences.
Kuhn argues that the "normal" practice of the natural sciences is
not the textbook formulation and testing of "hypotheses," but
the working out of the implications of "paradigms" that are
treated as absolute truths: In effect the "conceptual sphere"
is reified. This is precisely the situation that I have described
above in the case of the social sciences. The "conceptual sphere"
is the reality to which social scientists are oriented. We have then
a classic instance of the "fallacy of misplaced concreteness."
We have seen, for example, how the conceptual sphere de-
fines the parameters of "relevance." What is of interest is not
"social reality" as such, but the reality insofar as it is an exempli-
fication of application of the conceptual sphere. The social scient-
ist, who is shall we say lodged in the conceptual sphere, will not
read three pages of a manuscript that does not point to a con-
ceptual sphere of social science without expostulating in the
"inner voice," " ... this is not social science...." The extent
to which this is true is most clearly demonstrated in the "scholarly
arguments" of social science. These arguments, which move
entirely within the conceptual sphere, represent the ultimate
withdrawal ofsocial science into its own private corpus of thought.
The "world out there" is lost entirely from view within these argu- .
ments that compare Durkheim with Weber, or the "influence" of
Mead on Goffman, or that deliver a learned critique of the fate
of Weberian verstehende sociology in the hands of Schutz, etc.
The perennial fascination of social science with this narcissistic
terrain illustrates, as perhaps nothing can, what is really interest-
ing.
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This reification of the conceptual sphere is also demonstrated,
and most critically, with respect to "evidence." The canons of
evidence of the conceptual sphere define what is "social reality"
in a way that is, as we shall see further below, removed from
critical scrutiny. The social scientist faces social reality in his
own conventionally defined terms. What this means concretely
is that social science cannot confront the "evidence" of social
reality as this is presented in the world of ordinary experience.
Thus, the survey research oriented social scientist cannot deal
with the experience of marriage, work, literature, film, and theater
unless and until these spheres of social reality are "translated"
into the conventionally defined quantitative evidence of the
positivistic "conceptual sphere." This applies as well to ethno-
methodology and' phenomenological sociology, which, although
they consider themselves superior in this regard, cannot cope,
within the framework of their own canons of evidence, with the
"macro-" reality of economic life and politics.
This phenomenon of conservatism, or intellectual petri-
fication in a conceptual sphere is not exceptional or accidental.
It is the consequence of a "trained incapacity" to surmount the
horizons of the conceptual sphere that is part of the ordinary
process of professional training in the academic disciplines.
Graduate training consists of a system of rewards and punishments
that effectively disciplines the student in the ways of thought of
a conceptual sphere. The student is required to master the lan-
guage of the conceptual sphere of the graduate faculty, and pro-
ficiency and dexterity in the use of the established thought-modes
are the criterion for "go-od grades." The dissertation is the cul-
minating exercise in this solidification of the student's thought
in the model of that of the ruling professoriate: the "great men"
of the graduate faculty. The student is here required to think
"creatively" within the confines of the conceptual sphere, which
means to develop applications, and synthetic and scholarly argu-
ments, but explicitly not "new arguments" that might shake the
foundations of the thought-ways in which the faculty has invested
its intellectual capital.
And, once the student has graduated from this array of
institutional sanctions, and seeks to fulfill the imperatives of
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"publish or perish," a new set of sanctions awaits in the arena
of professional publication. The fledgling social scientist learns,
in the process of submitting books and articles for publication,
that the failure to adequately root the argument in established
conceptual spheres will be greeted with the fatal critique, "why
doesn't he mention so-and-so?" ("This person does not know
the literature"). Enough experience with this form of academic
wrist-slapping will eventually produce an "internalization" of the
critique, such that the "finished" social scientist will be incapable
of thinking in any terms, save that which is in "the literature."
The product of this training is a mind firmly demarcated by the
conventional parameters of thought in which it was trained.
The consequence for social science as a whole is an intellectual
culture of surpassing conservatism that is stolidly hostile to
"new arguments."
This conservatism acts as an effective barrier to the dif-
fusion of "new arguments," because social scientists, disciplined
into a reflexive adherence to the conceptual spheres in which they
were trained, are in no position to surmount the "paradigms"
of those spheres. If "new arguments" are to make their way they
must, in effect, by-pass the devotees of the old schools of thought,
who stand in an inflexible, life-long embrace with the ideas which
they received early in their careers. The mature social scientist
(and I fully recognize the presumptuous harshness of this state-
ment) has thus lost the capacity to think in new terms! Kuhn
vividly described .the consequences of .. this process for the dif-
fusion of "new arguments" in the natural sciences.f
Copernicanism made few converts for almost a century after
Copernicus' death. Newton's work was not generally accepted,
particularly on the continent, for more than half a century after
the Principia appeared. Priestly never accepted the oxygen
theory, nor Lord Kelvin the electomagnetic theory, and so on.
The difficulties of conversion have often been noted by scientists
themselves. Darwin, in a particularly perceptive passage at the
end of his Origin of Species, wrote: 'Although I am fully con-
vinced of the truth of the views given in. this volume ... I by no
means expect to convince experienced naturalists whose minds
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are stocked with a multitude of facts all viewed, during a long
course of years, from a point of view exactly opposite to
mine.... [B] ut I look with confidence to the future-to young
and rising naturalists, who will be able to view both sides of the
question with impartiality.' And Max Planck, surveying his own
career in his Scientific Autobiography, sadly remarked that "a
new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing its oppo-
nents and making them see the light, but rather because its
opponents eventually die, and a new generation grows up that
is familiar with it (Kuhn, 1970:150-151).
From all of this we derive a vision of the structure of the
social sciences at any moment in time as a field of mutually
exclusive conceptual spheres, or "schools of thought." Each of
these spheres consists of a private language that expresses its
domain of ideas, and each is superintended by a core of adherents
who dispense the perquisites of academic posts and publishing
possibilities, by which they are able to attract and discipline a
cohort of followers. Each such domain has its sphere of relevance
established by its ruling ideas and faces a "social reality" that is
also defined by those ideas, in terms of "canons of evidence."
And dispite all the rhetoric of "interdisciplinary" endeavor, these
schools of thought rarely encounter one another, and are, indeed,
hardly disposed to do so. Thus psychologists, historians, political
scientists, economists, and anthropologists proceed with their
academic business, more-or-less ignorant of, and indifferent to,
developments in other disciplines. Thus it is that within the
disciplinary domains; e.g_,'· sociology, the "structural-
functionalists," "neo-Marxists, " "phenomenologists," "ethno-
methodologists," "organizational theorists," "symbolic inter-
actionists," etc., meet, discuss, read one another's. work, and
dismiss the work of others as erroneous, irrelevant, or simply,
uninteresting. 6
How then, given this state of affairs, does social science
"progress"? I cannot, within the framework of this discussion,
deal with that weighty problem. But it is possible to observe here
that individual schools of thought cannot progress, because they
are locked into their conceptual spheres. Work within these con-
ceptual arenas consists of applications and synthetic arguments
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that explore the potentialities of the "paradigms" (see Kuhn,
1971, on "normal science"). And there comes a point, where,
having exhausted their basic ideas, the schools of thought slide
into a terminal state of senescence, in which they develop princi-
pally "scholarly arguments" that chew on the dry bones of earlier
arguments (e.g., "orthodox" Marxism, classical psycholanalysis,
and phenomenological sociology).
"New arguments" can only arise outside of the established
conceptual spheres (e.g., ethn~methodology, "conversational
analysis," and "attribution theory"), and will, in due course, also
exhaust the logic of their ruling ideas "and eventually be displaced
by further "new arguments" that will generate new conceptual
spheres. The problem in the social sciences, which again raises
issues beyond our present purview, is that the new conceptual
spheres do not absorb the insights of the old, but pass them by,
unlike the situation in the natural sciences, where the new para-
digms progressively enlarge the scope of the "facts" that they can
comprehend (Kuhn, 1971).
If we return now to our starting point, we can, from this
perspective, better appreciate the significance of the ubiquitous
academic challenge, "why doesn't he mention so-and-so." This is
not, as it may appear to the person who utters the cry, a con-
frontation of erudition with poor scholarship. It is rather, I sug-
gest, an important moment in the conservative impulse of social
science that disciplines the neglect of prevailing conceptual
spheres, and that thereby helps to throttle deviations from estab-
lished modes of thought. A social science that unwittingly deploys
such devices is fated to defeat its own purposes.
NOTES
1. Those who will ask "How does he know this?", i.e., "where are the
"data?", are referred to the discussion below on "canons of evidence."
2. On this point see Tiryakian (1966). I am indebted to my colleague,
Prof. N. ch. Tatsis for this citation, as well as for the constant pro-
vocations concerning my bibliographic shortcomings that have stimu-
lated the Writing of this essay.
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3. Some readers will perhaps ask at this point: "Why doesn't he men-
tion...?", but, considering the argument of this essay I shall, with
justification, forbear from doing so. See the concluding sections of the
argument, which point out the pathological consequences of indulging
this demand.
4. I limit this challenge to the "journalistic literature" because books can
obviously be directed towards a non-academic audience that is quite
innocent of any intellectual bondage to the conceptual sphere. This
was the route followed by C. Wright Mills and John K. Gailbraith, when
they decided that they could not effectively present their ideas within
the structures imposed by the conceptual spheres of the academic
world.
5. Along similar lines, Toulmin and Goodfield (1977) note what it "cost"
Charles Lyell to achieve the "conversion" to Darwinian theory:
Speaking in old age about his own first reaction to the
Origin of Species, he still regarded his eventual conver-
sion to Darwin's theory, not as the fulfillment of his earlier
vision, but its abandonment: 'it cost me a struggle to re-
nounce myoId creed' (1977:189).
6. Is there a reader perhaps still inclined to confront me at this point with
a "why doesn't he mention so-and-so?", i.e., the "literature" on the
"sociology of sociology," e.g., Gouldner, Friedrichs, Mullins, Ritzer,
etc. But what would be the point of such a citation, except to serve
as a "display of erudition," assuring the reader that I have read what
he has read! It will add not one iota to my argument.
REFERENCES
Anderson, Perry
1976 Considerations on Western Marxism. London: NLB.
Aron, Raymond
1964 German Sociology. Glencoe, rn.. Free Press.
Bellah, R.N.
1957 Tokugawa Religion. Glencoe, nt.. Free Press.
Berger, Peter L. and Thomas Luckmann
1967 The Social Construction of Reality. Garden City, N.Y.: Double-
day.
Bredemeier, Harry C.
1979 Review of 1. Blauberg, V.N. Saduvsky, E.G. Yudin, Systems
Theory: Philosophical and Methodological Problems (trans!'
from the Russian). Contemporary Sociology 9 :315-317.
83
Mid-American Review of Sociology
Cassirer, Ernst
1971 Das Erkenntnisproblem in der Philosophie und Wissenschaft
der Neveren Zeit (three vols.). Hildesheim: Georg Olms,
Collingwood, R.G.
1946 The Idea of History. New York: Oxford University Press.
Erikson, Erik
1950 Childhood and Society. New York: W.W. Norton.
Foucault, Michel
1970 The Order of Things. London: Tavistock.
1976 The Archeology of Knowledge. New York: Harper & Row.
Gove, Walter R.
1970 "Societal reaction as an explanation of mental illness: an eval-
uation." American Sociological Review 35:873-883.
Green, Edward
1970 "Race, social status, and criminal arrest." American Sociological
Review 35:476-490.
Hindess, Barry
1977 Philosophy and Methodology in the Social Sciences. Atlantic
Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press.
Kuhn, Thomas
1970 The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Lichtheim, George
1967 The Concept of Ideology. New York: Random House.
1976 Marxism. New York: Praeger.
Lofland, Lyn H.
1979 Review of R.G. Benton, Death and Dying. Contemporary Socio-
logy 8:276.
Lovejoy, Arthur o.
1936 The Great Chain of Being. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press.
McIntosh, Donald .
1970 "Weber and 'Freud: on' the nature and sources of-authority."-
American Sociological Review 35:901-911.
Meinecke, Friedrich
1965 Machiavellism: The Doctrine of Raison d'Etat and its Place in
Modern History. New York: Praeger.
Moore, Barrington
1967 The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Boston:
Beacon Press.
Paige, Jeffery M.
1975 Agrarian Revolution. New York: Free Press.
Parsons, Talcott
1968 The Structure of Social Action. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press.
1971 The System of Modern Societies. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Pren-
tice-Hall.
84
Why Doesn't He Mention
Parsons, Talcott and N.J. Smelser
1956 Economy and Society. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press.
Schutz, Alfred
1967 The Phenomenology of the Social World. Evanston, Ill.: North-
western University Press.
Smelser, N.J.
1959 Social Change in the Industrial Revolution. Chicago: University
of Chicago Press.
Smith, Thomas E.
1970 "Foundations of parental influence on adolescents: an applica-
tion of social power theory." American Sociological Review 35:
860-872.
Talmon,J.L.
1970 The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy. New York: W.W. Norton.
Tiryakian, Edward
1966 "A problem for the sociology of knowledge: the mutual unware-
ness of Emile Durkheim and Max Weber." Archives Europeenes
de Sociologie 7 :330-336.
Toulmin, Stephen and June Goodfield
1977 The Discovery of Time. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Wallerstein, Immanuel
1974 The Modern World-System. New York: Academic Press.
.'.
85
